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Het in kaart brengen van moraliteit is een ingewikkelde kwestie, die 
in de laatste jaren steeds meer in de belangstelling lijkt te komen. 
Begrippen als ‘morele ontwikkeling’ en ‘morele vooruitgang’ worden 
hierin vaak inwisselbaar gebruikt. Dit is niet correct volgens Michael 
Klenk: Het zijn verschillende concepten, maar ze staan niet compleet los 
van elkaar. Bovendien is het nog maar de vraag of ze beide meetbaar 
zijn.
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In the aftermath of  the financial crisis, heightened awareness of  ethical issues has sparked 
increased efforts toward moral 
education within universities 
and businesses. In many cases, 
psychological tests are used to 
measure whether moral development 
occurs. As long as we understand 
moral development as synonymous 
with moral progress, this may seem 
like a good sign: it would appear that 
such tests give us a handle on moral 
progress. Alas, moral development 
and moral progress are two very 
different things. And although we 
know a lot about moral development, 
what we know has little to do with 
moral progress. Let’s untangle both 
concepts. 
 Moral development 
theories aim to describe the 
development of  moral judgments 
within individuals over time. They are 
not to be confused with theories on 
the evolutionary history of  morality, 
which describe how the capacity 
or the intent for moral reasoning 
developed in the human species. 
The most influential theory of  moral 
development, devised by Lawrence 
Kohlberg, depicts moral judgements 
as being closely related to cognitive 
development and the ability for 
adopting a social perspective. Six 
distinguishable stages of  moral 
development appear to be universal: 
At the preconventional level, 
individuals think mostly in terms 
of  the (physical) consequences of  
actions (stage 1) or the satisfaction 
of  their personal needs (stage 2). At 
the conventional level, individuals 
focus on social expectations (stage 
3) and the rules of  society or other 
institutions of  authority (stage 4). 
Finally, at the postconventional 
level, individuals grasp moral rules 
as social, created constructs which 
are open to amendment from their 
creators (stage 5) or as universal 
and objective principles (stage 6). 
As you can see, to progress through 
developmental stages means to 
consider moral situations in ever 
more abstract ways. 
 The most widely-used 
tool to measure moral development 
according to the cognitive approach 
is the Defining Issues Test (DIT). 
The DIT has been used extensively: 
James Rest, inventor of  the test, 
reports that well over a thousand 
DIT-based studies, encompassing 
several hundred thousands of  
subjects have been published. The 
DIT presents test-takers with five 
moral dilemmas. They are asked to 
decide what to do in each of  these, 
and rank the importance of  twelve 
reasoning fragments in relation to 
each scenario. If  you were to take the 
test, for example, you would learn 
about the dire situation of  Mustaq 
Singh whose family is near starvation 
while a rich neighbour is hoarding 
large amounts of  food. You would 
have to decide whether Mr Singh 
ought to steal a small amount of  
food for his family and then rate and 
rank items such as ‘Is Mustaq Singh 
courageous enough to risk getting 
caught for stealing?’ and ‘What 
values are going to be the basis for 
social cooperation?’ in relation to 
their respective importance in the 
dilemma. The principal score of  the 
test is based on how many of  the 
highest ranked reasoning-fragments 
are from stages 5/6 of  the cognitive 
moral development framework. 
 The DIT allows us to 
understand consistent and universal 
patterns in our thinking about 
moral matters, which are shared 
across the globe. Correlative studies 
reveal relevant influences on moral 
development: Education, more so 
than age, is the most influential factor. 
Moreover, related tests of  moral 
development, such as the Moral 
Judgements Test, and tests based on 
alternative paradigms, such as the 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire, 
correlate significantly with the stages 
of  the DIT. In that context, the 
measurement of  moral development 
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works. Interestingly, only about 
20% of  test takers reach stage 5 or 
higher. On a side note, psychologists 
sometimes interpret stage 6 as the 
‘degree to which a person thinks 
about moral problems like a moral 
philosopher’. This suggests that 
philosophers’ assumptions about 
‘folk moral judgements’ often might 
depict these as more objective than 
they really are. 
 More importantly, however, 
the DIT and related measurement 
techniques for moral development 
do not by themselves warrant 
inferences about moral progress. 
Moral development merely describes 
ways of  thinking about moral matters 
and, as such, those ways of  thinking 
can be dissociated from moral values. 
So, unfortunately, reasoning at the 
‘moral philosopher’-stage of  this 
developmental model does not yet 
make you a good person; nor does 
it mean that education leads to moral 
progress all by itself. 
 Moral progress, conversely, 
depends on moral values. As an 
example, consider whether the 
continuous decrease of  violence in 
human history is a sign of  moral 
progress: I would say it does. But 
whether that is actually true depends 
on deeper normative and meta-
ethical questions: It depends on what 
values themselves are understood 
to be, and on which values one 
acknowledges as such.
 To judge that moral 
progress occurred is to make a 
comparative judgement that makes 
reference to values. What values 
there are will thus determine, 
as in our example, whether the 
decrease in violence counts as moral 
progress. But the issue with moral 
progress is not (only) the old issue 
of  moral disagreement. In fact, 
most philosophers would agree that 
the extension of  liberty and the 
reduction of  poverty would count as 
moral progress. However, to say that 
the world today is a morally better 
place than it was in 1517 is to make a 
comparative judgment between states 
of  affairs, which raises interesting 
questions about comparability and 
commensurability. Comparability 
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requires similarity, and it is often 
difficult to say whether two states 
of  affairs are sufficiently similar in 
moral terms to warrant comparison. 
Commensurability affects how we 
stack up different values against 
each other. For instance, poverty 
might be declining globally, but we 
must ask how the values this satisfies 
relate to other values that might be 
detrimentally affected. For example, 
the environment is likely to suffer 
when the rest of  the world catches 
up with the standards of  living of  the 
US and Western Europe. Ultimately, 
answers to both questions will 
depend on the nature of  values how 
they relate to each other. Hence, 
while we can determine moral 
development independent of  value 
judgements, we do still ultimately 
rely on them in judging whether 
moral progress has occurred.
 Although moral 
development and moral progress are 
fundamentally different phenomena, 
they do relate to each other. We 
might, perhaps, think about moral 
development as an enabler for moral 
progress as it helps us to grasp more 
of  the moral aspects of  a given 
situation. Ultimately, however, we 
still have to pick the certain values to 
give direction to our thoughts, and 
we have to take action. This, quite 
independent of  moral development, 
is where moral progress can take 
place. 
